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Sex, Trust, and Corporate Boards
Joan MacLeod Heminway"
I. INTRODUCTION
Many have indicated, directly or indirectly, that the highly publicized
corporate fraud at Enron, WorldCom, HealthSouth, Adelphia, and other
public companies represents or reflects a crisis of trust in corporate
America.' Directors of these corporations trusted corporate executives and
each other, corporate executives trusted each other, and investors trusted
both corporate directors and executives; in each case to his or her
respective detriment. The result? Distrust of and among corporate
constituencies.2
* Associate Professor, The University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B. 1982,
Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University School of Law. This Article was
presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and at the 2006
Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools. The author thanks
participants in these meetings for their helpful suggestions on this piece. Special thanks are
owed to Jayne Barnard and Lynne Dallas in this regard.
1. E.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY 9-24 (2006); andre douglas pond
cummings, "Ain't No Glory in Pain ": How the 1994 Republican Revolution and the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Contributed to the Collapse of the United States Capital
Markets, 83 NEB. L. REV. 979, 1072 (2005) ("The litany of corporate fraud cases has
undermined the public trust and generated support for more regulations."); Sarah Helene
Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney
Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 211, 223, 259-63 (2006) ("Today,
we are once again in the throes of a crisis in corporate trust."); Gregory Todd Jones, Trust,
Institutionalization, & Corporate Reputations: Public Independent Fact-Finding From A
Risk Management Perspective, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 121, 124 (2005) ("In recent times
... we have witnessed an avalanche of corporate wrongdoing or incompetence that has led
to widespread 'cris[es] of social legitimacy and [a] loss of public trust."').
2. See Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in
Agency, 15 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 45, 45-46 (2005); Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at
223. Two key corporate governance scholars explain this phenomenon well when they note,
signs of lack of trust and trustworthiness tend to be self-fulfilling. Once
players in a social dilemma game come to believe that their fellows intend to
defect, they themselves defect, and distrust prevails ....
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PENN L. REv. 1735, 1776 (2001).
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, related federal administrative
rulemaking and market regulation, and informal corporate governance
principles and guidelines have all been constructed as means of addressing
this perceived crisis. 3 Among the specific corporate governance reforms
introduced in these initiatives are directives and suggestions relating to
board composition. These reforms especially focus attention on the need
for, and the role of, independent directors on public company boards of
directors and board committees. 4  "Independence" is defined for these
purposes in a narrow manner to include a lack of financial and other formal
ties with the corporation outside the board room. 5 Independent directors
commonly are perceived as being less automatically trusting of corporate
management and incumbents. 6  (This, despite the fact that director
prospects - including candidates for independent director positions -
may be first identified or in some way vetted as potential nominees by the
3. See, e.g., Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at 261; Laurie A. Morin, Broken Trust
and Divided Loyalties: The Paradox of Confidentiality in Corporate Representation, 8 D.C.
L. REv. 233, 240 (2004) ("As one story after another hit the press, lawmakers felt compelled
to take action to restore public trust and confidence. The resulting legislation, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 ... , enacted sweeping reforms to rein in the corporate excesses
exemplified by Enron." (footnote omitted)); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L.
REv. 77, 86-90 (2003) (describing the regulatory reaction to the corporate fraud at the turn
of the century); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (describing both
perceived problems involving trust and honesty and the regulatory and nonregulatory
reforms) [hereinafter Market]; Tom D. Snyder, Jr., A Requiem for Client Confidentiality?:
An Examination of Recent Foreign and Domestic Events and their Impact on the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 50 Loy. L. REv. 439, 452 (2004) ("The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, also referred to as the 'Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'
was enacted, in part, to help restore trust in the U.S. financial markets .... ").
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(3) (Supp. 2003); New York Stock Exchange Listed
Company Manual § 303A (November 3, 2004), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/
section303Afinalrules.pdf; The NASDAQ Stock Market Inc., Corporate Governance, Rules
4200, 4200A, 4350, 4350A, 4351 & 4360 and Associated Interpretive Material (April 15,
2004), http://www.nasdaq.com/about/CorporateGovernance.pdf, American Stock Exchange
Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Approved by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (December 1, 2003), http://www.amex.com/?href=/atamex/news/amCorGov.
htm. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Marrying Diversity and Independence in the Boardroom:
Just How Far Have You Come, Baby? 1-3 (unpublished paper, on file with author);
Ribstein, Market, supra note 3, at 11-12.
5. Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 5-6, 12. See also, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax,
Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms
on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 381, 389 (2005)
("Sarbanes-Oxley narrowly defines independence with respect to compensation and a
director's affiliation with the company.").
6. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 4, 15 (describing independence as a
mechanism employed to prevent directors from reflexively rubber-stamping management
proposals). Cf Marleen A. O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1310 (2003) (noting scholarly fears that "too many independent directors
on a board may weaken the trust needed among the CEO and board members"). But see
O'Connor, supra, at 1250 (indicating that an independent director often assesses whether he
or she can trust a CEO before accepting a board seat).
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:2
Summer 2007] SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE BOARDS 175
chief executive officer of the corporation.7) Moreover, independent
directors may be perceived as more trustworthy than their insider
counterparts. 8 However, scholars are, at best, mixed in their assessments of
the value of this limited form of independence in fully resolving the crisis
of trust represented by the corporate fraud scandals of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first century. 9 In fact, the board of directors of Enron -
the veritable "poster child" for our most recent spate of corporate fraud -
had a board of directors largely composed of outside directors.' 0
Accordingly, attributes other than this narrowly conceived variety of
independence may be important in addressing perceived lapses of trust
through the composition or mechanics of the corporate board." The
7. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 13 ("CEOs, even where firms have
independent nominating committees, still heavily influence board selection."); id. at 15
("[D]irectors are initially selected for consideration by the CEO."); Janice Kay McClendon,
Bringing the Bulls to Bear: Regulating Executive Compensation to Realign Management
and Shareholders' Interests and Promote Corporate Long-Term Productivity, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 971, 987 (2004) ("[I]t is often the corporation's CEO who selects board
members, including 'independent directors' who serve on the. board's compensation
committee."); Randall S. Thomas, Explaining The International CEO Pay Gap: Board
Capture Or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1171, 1195 n.99 (2004) ("Board members
are obligated to the CEO even where the board has a nominating committee of independent
directors because a nomination will not proceed without the CEO's approval.").
Recent corporate governance reforms attempt to make nominations for board
election less subject to the influence of the CEO, such as through the use of
nominating committees comprised exclusively of independent directors or
by implementing the SEC's proposal to require certain companies to include
shareholder nominees for director slots in the company's proxy materials.
Richard S. Saver, Medical Research Oversight from the Corporate Governance Perspective:
Comparing Institutional Review Boards and Corporate Boards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv.
619, 651 (2004). See also DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, No SEAT AT THE TABLE 179-80 (2006).
8. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of
Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L.
REv. 885, 900 (2002) (noting that "Delaware case law has given more weight to board
decisions that are approved by independent, disinterested directors"); Daniele Marchesani,
The Concept of Autonomy and the Independent Director of Public Corporations, 2
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 315, 321-25 (2005) (describing factors indicating the perceived
trustworthiness of independent directors); Rachel A. Fink, Note: Social Ties In The
Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to Eliminate "Rubber-
Stamping" Boards, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 469 (2006) ("The reputational capital theory
maintains that shareholders can trust independent directors to execute their monitoring
duties effectively because if they do not, the market will punish them by hindering their
ability to receive future directorships.").
9. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 239 (2002); Beecher-
Monas, supra note 4, at 15-23; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and
Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REv.
1313, 1319 n.23 (2005).
10. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 5; Jones, supra note 1, at 128-29.
11. A noted Delaware Chancery Court jurist intimates this in a 2002 article.
Assuming that there are such things as truly "independent" directors, when
and to what extent are we willing to trust their judgment? Is there some
basis to believe that we should defer (i.e., give business judgment rule
possibility exists, for example, that the sex - male or female status 12 - of
a director may be an attribute to consider when looking at restoring trust in
and within the corporation through the board of directors. To explore that
possibility, this Article first summarizes recent works by nonlegal scholars
on sex and trust, focusing most closely on three studies of populations
within the United States. 13  Then the Article makes observations and
suggestions about the impact of these works on overall corporate decision
making and draws related conclusions about board composition.
II. RESEARCH ON GENDERED TRUST
Trust is a significant area for psychological, sociological,
anthropological, and economic study, in general and across cultural and
gender-based lines.14 This is not surprising. Trust significantly impacts
and reflects economic and social interactions in a cultural context; a lack of
trust can have serious deleterious effects on society. 15  Gender also has
been an active, even if not fully accepted, area for scholarly inquiry in the
deference) to decisions made by a board comprised of a majority of
independent directors, but not those made by a board minority? Do we
believe that deference should only be given if the independent directors are
empowered to act on their own, with the active advice of financial and legal
advisors, and without participation and involvement by insiders?
These issues raise interesting psychological and sociological questions.
What are the motivations that drive most directors? Are independent
directors likely to behave in a more trustworthy and effective manner when
they are in the majority? Or specifically charged as a separate committee to
act only for the minority?
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 505 (2002).
12. The word "gender" (together with derivatives of that word), which is based on
social construction, sometimes is used in lieu of the more strictly biologically referential
term "sex" (or its derivative forms) in this Article.
13. Some of the referenced supporting studies test populations outside the United
States in addition to or instead of populations inside the United States. Because of cultural
differences in trust behaviors, the author has not relied on the findings of these studies in
drawing her conclusions in this Article about U.S. corporate directors.
14. See, e.g., Nava Ashraf et al., Is Trust a Bad Investment? 7 (Nov. 2003),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=478881; William M. Maddux &
Marilynn B. Brewer, Gender Differences in the Relational and Collective Bases for Trust, 8
GROUP PROC'S & INTERGROUP REL'NS 161 (2005).
15. See, e.g., Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 14 ("Without trust in the corporate
governance system, the economy will stagnate. It is a truism that economic growth and
financial development depend on the willingness of investors to trust their funds to the
management of others."); Michele P. Claiboum & Paul S. Martin, Trusting and Joining? An
Empirical Test of the Reciprocal Nature of Social Capital, 22 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 267,
268-69 (2000); Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at 256; Kessely Hong & Iris Bohnet,
Status and Distrust: The Relevance of Inequality and Betrayal Aversion 2 (Sept. 2004),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract id=600642; Jones, supra note 1, at 123-24,
146, 159-60; Alan S. Miller & Tomoko Mitamura, Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy?, 66
SOCIAL PSYCH. QUARTERLY 62, 62 (2003).
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social sciences.16 Accordingly, social science scholars from a wide variety
of fields have begun to explore the extent to which trust may be gendered.
Legal scholars also have contributed to this emerging body of work.17 The
following portion of this article describes key findings of some of the
recent scholarly explorations relating to sex and trust.
A. SEX AND TRUSTING
18
Trust, variously defined in the literature, 19 exposes the trusting person
to vulnerability. 20 Both men and women manifest trusting behavior in their
relationships with others. In fact, research tends to indicate, to varying
extents, that men and women exhibit trusting behaviors equally.
2
'
Scholarly work in this area, however, continues to be refined and
expanded. Studies of sex and trust now are more nuanced, and the
outcomes and interpretations of these studies therefore have become
increasingly valuable.22
16. See. e.g., Kelley Hays-Gilpin, Feminist Scholarship in Archaeology, 571 ANNALS
89 (2000); Beth B. Hess, Beyond Dichotomy: Drawing Distinctions and Embracing
Differences, 5 SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 75 (1990); Maureen J. Lage & Michael Treglia, The
Impact of Integrating Scholarship on Women into Introductory Economics: Evidence from
One Institution, 27 J. ECON. EDUC. 26 (1996); Gretchen Ritter & Nicole Mellow, The State
of Gender Studies in Political Science, 571 ANNALS 121 (2000); Rachel A. Rosenfeld, What
Do We Learn about Difference from the Scholarship on Gender?, 81 SOCIAL FORCES 1
(2002).
17. LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 254-
57 (2005).
18. So as to avoid confusion over the use of the word "trust," the author uses the
term "trusting" to evidence a person's trust in another and "trustworthiness" to signify a
person's capacity to engender the trust of others. The concept of "trust" encompasses both.
19. See DALLAS, supra note 17, at 246-48; Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1745 n.16;
Kurt T. Dirks & Donald L. Ferrin, The Role of Trust in Organizational Settings, 12
ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE 450, 451 (2001); Jones, supra note 1, at 132-39; Christopher R.
Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REv. 515, 529-32 (2004); Susan P. Shapiro,
The Social Control ofImpersonal Trust, 93 AMER. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 623, 625-26 (1987).
20. Ashraf et al., supra note 14, at 2; Dirks & Ferrin, supra note 19, at 451; Hong &
Bohnet, supra note 15, at 3-11. "We describe trust as a willingness to make oneself
vulnerable to another .. " Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1739-40. See id. at 1746.
21. See Rachel Croson & Nancy Buchan, Gender and Culture: International
Experimental Evidence from Trust Games, 89 AMER. ECON. REv. 386, 389-90 (May 1999);
Hong & Bohnet, supra note 15, at 24; Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal, The trust
Game behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences 3-4, 11 (Aug. 2005),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=807724. Some studies find that men are
more trusting than women or that women are more trusting than men. See Hong & Bohnet,
supra note 15, at 24; Alessandro Innocenti & Maria Grazia Pazienza, Altruism and Gender
in the Trust Game 2-3, 11-12 (May 2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=884378.
22. Many of the empirical studies referenced in this article use "trust games" as their
principal tool. These tests admittedly may be limited in predictive value because of test
parameters, including those involving the nature of the participants. See generally Edward
H. Hagen & Peter Hammerstein, Game Theory and Human Evolution: A Critique of Some
Recent Interpretations of Experimental Games, 69 THEORETICAL POPULATION BIOLOGY 339
(2006). For example, most trust games are run in university research settings, so the
For example, a recent study (the "Maddux & Brewer study") indicates
that men and women may differ in the bases for their trusting behavior.
2 3
Specifically, the Maddux & Brewer study indicates that men base their
trust in others most prominently on shared group status (collective trust),
while women base their trust in others on both shared group status and the
existence of personal relationships (relational trust). This research follows
on earlier work identifying two forms of "self' - collective and relational
- that correlate with gender. The Maddux & Brewer study extends that
earlier work further into the area of interdependent relationships by
focusing on depersonalized trust.
24
The Maddux & Brewer study involves the online decisions of 147
students at Ohio State University.25 Specifically, the students were asked
to choose between receipt of a fixed financial payment (three dollars) from
the researchers and receipt of an unfixed share of a larger amount (eleven
dollars) from - and as allocated by - an unknown person. Each student
was given this option three independent times. The difference in each case
was the limited information given to the decision maker about the unknown
allocator. In one trial, the allocator was described as another student at
Ohio State University. In another, the allocator was described as a student
from another university at which the decision maker has an acquaintance
(as indicated by previous responses to survey questions). In the third trial,
the allocator was described as a student from another university at which
the decision maker has no acquaintance. The three trials were randomly
ordered for each participant.
Confirming prior research,26 men and women did not differ in the
extent to which they chose the unknown allocation over the fixed
27payment. Moreover, both men and women trusted the student from their
subjects are students. Test subjects that have retired from the work force also are becoming
more common. However, studies involving trust games using working middle class
subjects, which may be the most relevant population for purposes of gauging director
behaviors, are rare.
23. Maddux & Brewer, supra note 14, at 159-71.
24. Id. at 159-61.
25. The discussion in this paragraph is derived from the text id. at 163-65.
26. See Croson, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
27. Although Maddux and Brewer hypothesized that men would choose the fixed
payment over the unknown allocation more often than women (which proved not to be the
case), Maddux and Brewer theorize that male risk-taking preferences may have offset the
expected result. Maddux & Brewer, supra note 14, at 168. Another set of researchers offers
the same and other explanations for similar results in other studies, Vyrastekova &
Onderstal, supra note 21 at 4, although not all research corroborates the existence of gender-
related risk preferences. See Renre B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in the
Boardroom 11-12 (Aug. 2004), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=594506.
The design and findings of studies indicating that men sometimes trust more than women
may provide other answers. See Croson, supra note 21 and accompanying text. Moreover,
it is interesting to note that a cross-cultural study found that a woman's decision whether to
trust also may have a different basis than a man's decision whether to trust. Ashraf et al.,
supra note 14, at 24, 30 ("We find that women are motivated differently than men when
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own university about equally. However, women trusted the student from
another university at which they had an acquaintance significantly more
often than men did. From these outcomes, Maddux and Brewer conclude
that "cross-group relationships had a greater impact on trust for women,
while the categorical distinction between ingroup and outgroup was more
important for men. 28
B. SEX AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
Trustworthiness, like trusting behavior, is variously defined and
construed in the literature. 29  The term often is seen as exclusively or
primarily related to trusting behavior as a reciprocal trait.3° (In other
words, one trusts another who one believes to be trustworthy, and one who
is trustworthy receives trust from another.) However, many scholars now
believe that both trust and trustworthiness may be at least somewhat
independently motivated.3' Research has begun to bear out this belief;
trustworthiness may, but need not always, be positively correlated with
trusting behavior.32 Accordingly, this Article treats the concepts of trust
and trustworthiness as conceptually, but not necessarily or always
practically, linked.
Many social science scholars have focused on other-regarding
preferences 33 (such as unconditional kindness 34 or altruism35) and risk-
aversion 36  as determinants of trustworthiness. Assessments of
deciding about whether to trust or not, independent of their race or the country of origin:
They trust conditional on their expectations of return.").
28. Maddux & Brewer, supra note 14, at 168.
29. For a taste of this variety and related interpretations of trusting behavior, see
Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 1-5; Jones, supra note 1, at 139-41.
"[T]rustworthiness ... [may be seen as] an unwillingness to exploit a trusting person's
vulnerability even when external rewards favor doing so." Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at
1740.
30. See Ashraf et a], supra note 14, at 2; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 3-4.
One may trust because he or she may expect reciprocal trust from the trustee. See DALLAS,
supra note 17, at 249 (hay baler example).
31. See, e.g., DALLAS, supra note 17, at 247-48; Ashraf et al, supra note 14, at 2;
Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 3. The study of motivations underlying trust
transactions allows for a socioeconomic definition of trust. Dallas, supra note 17, at 247.
32. Ashraf et al., supra note 14, at 2-5; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 13-
14.
33. In general, these are behavioral attributes or actions that take into account or
otherwise involve other people. Other-regarding preferences stand in stark contrast to
purely selfish or self-centered actions.
34. Unconditional kindness here means the derivation of personal satisfaction by
benefiting others. See Ashraf, supra note 14, at 2.
35. Although researchers do not tend to define this term in their work, we may
assume that they are referencing "unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 34 (10th ed. 1993).
36. This term describes "a net effect - a person's willingness to accept the gamble
of trust [that] depends on the costs she [a trustor] incurs if the worst possible outcome is
realized and the benefits she derives from receiving the best possible outcome." Hong &
Summer 2007]
trustworthiness based on other-regarding preferences may be gendered and
tend to be based on norms that are defined as valuations - internal to the
strategic situation - of a certain choice. Women would tend to interpret
the economic exchange more communally and empathically and thus to
repay trust with trustworthiness in return more than men. Female
behaviour would exhibit more trustworthiness because women's
preferences are more other-regarding than men' S.
3 7
Risk-aversion derives meaning from behavioral economics 38 and is a
self-protective, and therefore self-interested, behavior.39 Although other-
regardedness and risk-aversion are the focus of the trustworthiness
observations made in this article, trustworthiness also can be explained by
other attributes of trust relationships, 40 including inequity aversion,
41
betrayal aversion,42 and warm-glow kindness. 43  Socioeconomic theory
Bohnet, supra note 15, at 5.
37. Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 5. See also Catherine E. Eckel & Philip
J. Grossman, Are Women Les Selfish than Men?: Evidence from Dictator Experiments, 108
Econ. J. 732-33 (1998) (finding that women are less selfish than men in a double-
anonymous dictator setting).
38. As one group of researchers notes,
Risk aversion plays a central role in economic theory. It helps us understand
why individuals insure and save, why investors do not place all their eggs in
the basket offering the highest expected payoff, and why entrepreneurs earn
a generous premium. But risk aversion alone may not account for people's
willingness to take risk when the chance event is the action of other people
rather than nature, for then additional considerations may enter.
Iris Bohnet et al., Betrayal Aversion on Four Continents 2 (Feb. 2006),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=902370.
39. The perceived risks may include risks of legal or market sanctions. See Blair &
Stout, supra note 2, at 1747-50.
40. E.g., Ashraf, supra note 14, at 2-3; Hong & Bohnet, supra note 15, at 4-7;
Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 1, 13-14.
41. "Inequity aversion," also known as "inequality aversion," references a person's
strength of preference against being treated unequally by another and contrasts with the self-
interest generally assumed by economic rationalists. See Avner Shaked, The Rhetoric of
Inequity Aversion 4 (Mar. 1, 2005), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=675227; Hideshi Itoh, Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences 3 (Sep.
12, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cftn?abstractid=454500.
42. "Betrayal aversion" represents a person's strength of preference against another's
deceit or disloyalty. Iris Bohnet et al., The Elasticity of Trust: Evidence from Kuwait,
Oman, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates and the United States 13 (July 2005),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=779484 ("a hesitancy to take on a trust
risk because the agent may not be trustworthy."). "Betrayal aversion comes into play when
the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. That is, people may be more
averse to being betrayed by another person than to losing in a gamble." Bohnet et al., supra
note 38, at 11.
Be you Shamus or Shakespeare, betrayal is a central theme of human
behavior. Whether in the modem era or the ancient world, agents at times
betray their principals. The executives of Enron and Tyco betrayed their
shareholders, and Cassius betrayed Caesar. The implications of our strong
findings on betrayal aversion are that shareholders would prefer a 1% chance
of losing half their value due to a natural catastrophe than an equivalent
chance and loss due to the malfeasance of corporate leaders; similarly, that
[Vol. 18:2HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE BOARDS
may be seen to classify these and other motivations underlying
trustworthiness into three principal descriptive categories: normative,
affective, and instrumental. a Significant ongoing empirical and theoretical
work is being undertaken to better identify and define the bases for
trustworthiness.
In general, the literature indicates with reasonable consistency that
women are more trustworthy than men in a variety of test situations. 45
Current studies provide additional evidence of this and other sex-oriented
differences in trustworthiness.4 6 For example, in a number of trust-based
and other studies, women test as more altruistic and more risk-averse or
risk-perceptive than men.47 (It should be noted here, however, that the
trustor's perception of the trustee's altruism or risk-aversion may be more
important than the reality.)48  These sex-based differentiations, when
viewed together with overall high levels of trusting behavior, reinforce the
possibility of different (but potentially overlapping) motivators or
biological, social, or psychological markers for trust and trustworthiness.
A psychological study reported in the late 1990s (the "Collins study")
profiling women's psychological and biographical attributes supports the
view that women have identifiable traits that may suited them well for
positions of trust and security.49 Most importantly, the Collins study
political leaders would rather risk a 1% chance of being killed by accident
than by a subordinate. Betrayal costs are real and significant, and thus
require attention in our understanding of decision-making.
Bohnet et al., supra note 38, at 14.
43. "Warm-glow kindness," as a basis for trustworthiness, has been described as
"psychological benefits that an individual derives from being kind to others." Ashraf, supra
note 14, at 3.
44. DALLAS, supra note 17, at 247.
45. See, e.g., Crosan & Buchan, supra note 21 at 390; Innocenti & Pazienza, supra
note 21, at 3-4; Vyrastekova & Onderstal, supra note 21 at 2-3.
46. Innocenti & Pazienza, supra note 21, at 11; Vyrastekova & Onderstal, supra note
21, at 11-12.
47. See, e.g., Gary Chamess & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Financial Risk-
taking 14 (Dec. 5, 2004), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstractid=648735 ("In
every study that uses these simple investment choices, women make smaller investments
than do men, and so appear to be financially more risk averse."); Innocenti & Pazienza,
supra note 21, at 14 (asserting that women are more altruistic than men); Dan M. Kahan et
al., Gender, Race, and Risk Perception: The Influence of Cultural Status Anxiety 1-3 (May
16, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=723762 (describing research
indicating that women are more risk-perceptive than men); Alexandra Niessen & Stefan
Ruenzi, Sex Matters: Gender and Mutual Funds 3 (Mar. 2006), http://www.cfr-ologne.de/
downloads/workingpaper/cfr-06-01 .pdf (finding that female mutual fund managers invest in
"moderately less risky portfolios," "follow less extreme investment styles," and have lower
turnover ratios); id. at 5-6 (citing to other research on gender-based risk-aversion and
distinguishing the risk-aversion of female non-managers from that of female managers).
48. Cf Chamess & Gneezy, supra note 47, at 1.
49. Judith M. Collins & Michael D. Collins, Integrity in the Corporate Suite:
Predictors of Female Fraud 7-25 (Nov. 1999), http://www.intemationalmta.org/Documents/
1999/Proceedings 1 999.pdf.
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provides new profiling information about female white collar criminals.5 °
The Collins study indicates that: (1) women may commit white collar
crimes for reasons that are different from those motivating men;51 and (2)
women who commit white collar crimes have definable psychological traits
that can be tested and vetted before they are employed or otherwise called
to service by an organization.52 Among other things, these differences and
traits indicate other-regarding preferences consistent with the results of
prior and subsequent research on trustworthiness.53
The Collins study analyzes the output from inventories administered to
243 women, seventy-one of whom were imprisoned for white-collar crimes
and 172 of whom were high-level corporate administrators and managers.54
These inventories measured various psychological and biographical
variables, including socialization (compliance with social norms), self-
control, empathy, responsibility, socioeconomic status, leadership activity,
social involvement, parental relationship, sibling rivalry, and social
dominance. The results of these inventories then were tabulated and
assessed using statistical analyses. Interviews also were conducted.55
Among the findings are two key observations relevant to trustworthiness:
Female white collar criminals report criminal behavior that can be
described as other-regarding in an altruistic sense; and female white collar
criminals are empathetic.56
1. Female White Collar Criminals are Other-Regarding
Women in the Collins study who committed white collar crimes
typically did so not to benefit themselves, but to benefit others.57
Moreover, each of these female offenders expressed remorse for her
50. Female offenders, in general are an understudied population about which reliable
data and analyses are just emerging. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty's Reward-A Felony
Conviction: Recent Prosecutions of High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
843, 848 (2006). This is particularly true in the area of white collar crime, where data is
relatively scarce. NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE COLLAR CRIME
xv (2005) ("[T]he data available to investigators of white-collar crime pale in quality and
comprehensiveness beside data available on street crime.").
51. Collins & Collins, supra note 49, at 20-21.
52. Id. at 21-22.
53. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
54. Except as otherwise noted, the description in this paragraph is derived from the
text Collins & Collins, supra note 49, at 13-14.
55. Id. at 21.
56. A recent law review article submits that loyalty to a male wrongdoer may play a
role in white collar crime offenses committed by women at high levels in corporate
America. Jacobs, supra note 50, at 874-75. This thesis provides an interesting, and
consistent, corollary to the Collins study findings.
57. Collins & Collins, supra note 49, at 21. One cannot help but contrast, from our
vantage point in 2006, Martha Stewart's 2004 criminal conviction for obstruction of justice
and false statements (which was based on actions taken by Stewart assertedly for her own
benefit) with the convictions of the subject women offenders in the Collins study in this
regard. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 863-64.
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crime. 58 Although the Collins study does not involve a direct comparison
of the attributes of female and male offenders, the researchers note that this
female white collar offender profile is quite different from that observed in
other studies for male offenders. 59 It is significant to note that the other-
regardedness exhibited by the female white collar criminals in the Collins
study was directed toward constituencies outside the corporation (i.e.,
toward family members, rather than toward shareholders or other corporate
constituents).6 ° Collins and Collins suggest that this study is just a
beginning and that more work is needed to test sex-based differences in
white collar offenders.61
2. Female White Collar Criminals Exhibit Empathy
The Collins study also finds that certain distinct personality and
biographical characteristics exist for female white collar offenders and
female non-offender corporate executives. The researchers note that
several of their findings relating to female offenders (notably, those
regarding self-control and empathy) deviate from the results reported in
then existing literature focusing on male offenders and support a sex-based
distinction in the profiling of white collar criminals.62
Especially important among these results is the finding that both female
white collar criminals and female executives are empathetic.63 (Previous
research indicates that male offenders lack empathy.) 64 As previously
noted, empathy is a possible source of trustworthiness. 65 The empathy
manifested by female white collar criminals may lead others to deem them
trustworthy, even in circumstances where that trustworthiness may not be
warranted (when viewed in concert with other psychological and
biographical traits of these women).66
3. Bottom Line on Sex and Trustworthiness
Based on the foregoing and other related findings in the Collins study,
the researchers express their view that, among other things, the results of
their study provide employers and other organizations with information that
58. Collins & Collins, supra note 49, at 21.
59. Id.
60. Id. ("The structured interviews revealed a common theme for the commission of
the crimes: husbands, parents, or children were in financial trouble. Several females said
they committed the fraud because of health care and other problems for either parents or
family.").
61. Id. at 21-22. Among other things, the authors note that the subjects of the study
may not have responded honestly to the survey instrument. Id. at 21.
62. Id. at 21-22.
63. Id. at 21.
64. Id.
65. Specifically, empathy is an other-regarding trait associated with altruism. See
supra notes 33-35 & 37.
66. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Summer 2007] SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE BOARDS 183
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
is useful in promoting and conducting the psychological and biographical
testing of women to better ensure their suitability in positions of trust and
security.67 The traits predicting trustworthiness in female executives may
be different from those predicting trustworthiness in male executives. Said
another way, women and men may be untrustworthy for different reasons.
In particular, although other-regarding preferences (including empathy)
generally are labeled as determinants of trustworthiness, when taken alone,
they may not be accurate indicators of trustworthiness in women.
C. SEX AND THE OVERALL TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Arguably, men and women both engage in trusting behavior (albeit on
different bases) and women generally test as more trustworthy than men.
Because women exhibit, and can be tested for, traits that indicate both
actual trustworthiness and a lack of propensity for white collar crime, then
why - especially during this post-Enron crisis of trust in corporate
America - are there so few women in the corporate executive ranks and
on public company boards of directors? 68  Of course, age-old group
behaviors favoring homogeneous corporate boards persist.69 Moreover, the
pool of talent from which corporate directors typically are chosen includes
few women. 70  Also, education of the relevant populations (corporate
directors, in principle part) as to the positive attributes of, and available
qualified numbers of, female directors (identified in emerging scholarly
literature) may not have occurred to the extent necessary to make an
impact. 71 However, the possibility also exists that there is a bias against
women corporate leaders.72 That bias is being observed and documented in
current research.
67. Collins & Collins, supra note 49, at 22.
68. Professors Douglas M. Branson and Lisa M. Fairfax recently have summarized
the progress of women and people of color on corporate boards. See BRANSON, supra note
7, at 87-108, 150-53, 187-92; Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on
Women Directors and Continued Barriers to their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 581 -
89 (2006) [hereinafter Mixed Data]; Lisa M. Fairfax, Some Reflections on the Diversity of
Corporate Boards: Women, People of Color, and the Unique Issues Associated with Women
of Color, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1105 (2005) [hereinafter Reflections].
69. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 47.
70. See BRANSON, supra note 7, at 90-91, 110, 148-50; Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra
note 68, at 599-601 (2006); Fairfax, Reflections, supra note 68, at 1112-13.
71. See, e.g., Susan M. Adams & Patricia M. Flynn, Local Knowledge Advances
Women's Access to Corporate Boards, 13 CORP. Gov.: AN INTL REV. 836 (2005); Business
Wire, Rate of Women 's Advancement to Top Corporate Officer Positions Slow, New
Catalyst Tenth Anniversary Census Reveals; Projected Trend Indicates It Could Take 40
Years for Women to Achieve Parity with Men in Corporate Officer Ranks (July 26, 2006).
72. Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 68, at 601-02. See also BRANSON, supra note 7,
at 55-74.
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A recent study (the "Bigelow & McLean Parks study") provides
evidence that investors do not trust female corporate leaders.73
Specifically, the Bigelow & McLean Parks study concludes that, despite
evidence of the success of women in the corporate environment,
prospective investors in an initial public offering ("IPO") are willing to
invest more in a corporation that has a male Chief Executive Officer
("CEO") than they would invest in a corporation that has a female CEO 74
- and they also are willing to compensate that male CEO better than they
would compensate a woman with the exact same qualifications for service
in that exact same role.75
The Bigelow & McLean Parks study involves a survey conducted with
222 students in a Masters in Business Administration program.76
Participants were given background reading materials, including a variety
of investment data and information, relating to the IPO of a fictitious
corporation and were asked to respond to a survey regarding the CEO and
the senior management team (referred to in the study report as the "top
management team" or "TMT"). Among the background reading materials
were summaries of the qualifications of the CEO and other senior
executives of the corporation. In materials given to certain of the test
subjects, the CEO was female, and in others, the CEO was male. In either
case, test subjects were given information that included TMTs with varied
gender distributions.77 The gender of the CEO and senior executives was
indicated using photographs and gendered names. These sex differences
were the only variables in the background reading materials; financial
factors and operational information relating to the fictitious corporation, for
example, were not altered in the materials.78 The study tested a variety of
reactions based on both the sex of the CEO and the sex distribution of the
senior management team.
73. Lyda S. Bigelow & Judi McLean Parks, Skirting the Issues: A "Green Ceiling"
for Female Entrepreneurs (unpublished paper, on file with author).
74. Id. at 24.
75. Id. at 25.
76. Except as otherwise noted, the summary in this paragraph is derived from the
text. Id. at 18-19.
77. Sex distributions within the TMT varied from homogeneous (all one sex), to
skewed (85 percent/15 percent), to tilted (65 percent/35 percent), to balanced (50 percent/50
percent). Id. at 19.
78. Id. at 30, 31 (explaining that researchers used the financial statements from a real
IPO in their test materials to enhance the realism of the investment information offered to
participants).
Summer 20071
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
The sex of the CEO was significant over all tested areas, including
assessments related to the senior management team.79 In each case,
participant evaluations of the CEO and the management team were less
favorable when the CEO was female. Among other things, the participants:
would invest almost three times as much in the male CEO-led
corporation;80 more positively evaluated the skills of the male CEO than
those of the female CEO;8' allotted the female CEO only 86 percent of the
compensation allotted to the male CEO;82 and judged the management team
more favorably when it was led by the male CEO.83  "That gender
stereotypes had such a significant impact on the amount that naive
investors were willing to invest; on the perceived qualification of the CEO,
qualifications that were identical in every way; and, through the CEO, on
perceptions of the TMT process, is more than a little troubling.
' 84
Interestingly, the gender mix of the senior management team did not
test as significant to the participant investors. Participants did not isolate
significant differences in strategic assessments, capabilities, or processes
based on the sex composition of the overall management team (apart from
the female CEO factor).85 These findings regarding the sex composition of
management teams are, indeed, quite surprising when compared to the
results regarding the sex of the CEO. However, Bigelow and McLean
Parks caution that their manipulation of the demographics of the board may
have unintentionally affected these results. 86
79. Bigelow and McLean Parks summarize the results in this regard as follows:
Based on our data, we find that the sex of the CEO is the only salient
evaluative component of the top management team to naive investors. Our
sample suggests that the market does not "see" sex as a predictor of
potentially better performance (and, of course, once they do, the market will
accommodate it in pricing, and the effect will disappear). Disconcertingly,
they do pick up on sex as a marker, but their stereotypes overwhelm their
interpretation of the marker, potentially causing them to make poor
decisions.
Bigelow & McLean Parks, supra note 73, at 28.
80. Id. at 24.
81. Id. at 23-24.
82. Id. at 25.
83. Id. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 30. This conclusion and the related findings in the Bigelow & McLean
Parks study are similar to the conclusion and findings of another recent study involving sex
differences in mutual fund managers. See Niessen & Ruenzi, supra note 47, at 3-4 (noting
that inflows to female-managed mutual funds are lower than those to male-managed funds,
despite (1) the lack of a significant difference in average portfolio performance and (2) more
persistent performance of female-managed portfolios, and attributing these findings to
"stereotyping of fund investors who for some reason believe male managers do a better job
in managing money").
85. Id. at 23.
86. Id. at 29.
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III. SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
The relationship of existing, general gendered trust research to
corporate decision making is not clear or conclusive. Moreover, trust
games, inventories, interviews, and other testing devices represented in the
social science literature are admittedly imperfect tools for measuring and
classifying trusting behavior and trustworthiness, and study design or
implementation in individual cases may be less than optimal.87 For these
reasons, one must be cautious about extrapolating too much from the few
gender-based studies regarding trust that are summarized and cited to in
Part I of this Article. However, even from this imperfect knowledge base,
certain limited, preliminary observations and suggestions regarding
linkages between social science trust research and corporate governance
may be made. These observations and suggestions emanate from
interpretations of social science study results on sex and trust in light of the
components of corporate governance and existing empirical and theoretical
corporate governance scholarship.
In general, existing social science trust research tells us that both men
and women are trusting. Moreover, both men and women may be
trustworthy. These general conclusions are important in relation to
corporate decision making. Trust - both trusting behavior and
trustworthiness - is essential to the effective operation of the corporation
in general and the constitution and operation of a corporate board and
corporate management in particular.88 Trust is at the heart of the fiduciary
relationships that characterize corporate governance and comprise the
89
corporation. Moreover, without trust, consensus would be difficult to
achieve and decision making would be inefficient.90 However, trust issues
87. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1777-78; Bigelow & McLean Parks,
supra note 73. In particular, it should be noted that the Maddux & Brewer study and the
Bigelow & McLean Parks study involve student test subjects, which may limit the
applicability of the results of these studies to other populations. See text and sources cited
supra note 22. Further, the Collins study involves self-reported traits and behaviors, which
may give rise to nonobjective, inaccurate, or otherwise faulty data. See Collins & Collins,
supra note 49, at 21. Finally, the Collins study does not differentiate among female white
collar offenders by corporate position or crime, which may limit the applicability of its
results in this context. See Jacobs, supra note 50, at 849-50.
88. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1738, 1757-58; Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1,
at 256-57; Marchesani, supra note 8, at 341.
89. See DALLAS, supra note 17, at 255-56; cf Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1743-
44; Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at 257-68. In fact, fiduciary relationships are
conceptually rooted in trust. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate
Theory, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 28 (2006) ("The Latin root of fiduciary - 'fides' - means
'faith,' as in trust, reliability, or faith-fulness.").
90. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 152-54, 341-42 (1995) (outlining reductions in transaction costs and other
efficiencies occasioned by trusting behaviors in business); Donald C. Langevoort, The
Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 812-13 (2001) (exploring effects on
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in corporate governance also have a negative side. Trust may be
undermined, rather than reinforced, by applicable statutory and decisional
law. For example, the monetary liability of corporate directors for breach
of the duty of care may be limited by corporate charter exculpation
provisions, undercutting one legal basis for trust in corporate decision
making. 9' Also, for some, the ultimate Delaware Supreme Court opinion in
the stockholder derivative action against directors and officers of The Walt
Disney Company further shook the bedrock of trust foundational to
Delaware corporate fiduciary duties.92 And, as we have learned from the
corporate fraud uncovered in the early twenty-first century, even in a
corporate govemance system where codependence is encouraged, trust may
be misplaced, both by board members or executives and on board members
or executives.93
A. TRUSTING BEHAVIOR AND CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
Gender differences in the bases for trusting behavior (in the form of
collective versus relational trust) are not apparently value-laden in a
general sense; women are not necessarily more or less well-suited to being
directors or executives than men based on existing research on gendered
trusting behavior. Neither collective nor relational trust is superior to the
other, taken in the abstract. They are merely different rationales for
trusting. However, taken in a particular context, one form of trusting
behavior may be implicated where another may not. Based on these
observations, how, then, might collective and relational trust be implicated
in or impact corporate decision making?
For one, if male or female board members view themselves as being in
board productivity of mistrust and trust between corporate boards and chief executive
officers). See also Leslie, supra note 19, at 532-33 (describing the general relationship
between trust and cooperative behavior).
Where trust can be harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies
associated with both agency and team production relationships. Trust
permits transactions to go forward on the basis of a handshake rather than a
complex formal contract; it reduces the need to expend resources on constant
monitoring of employees and business partners; and it avoids the uncertainty
and expense associated with trying to enforce formal and informal
agreements in the courts. Trust behavior also reduces losses from others'
undetectable or unpunishable opportunistic behavior, losses that could
discourage the formation of valuable agency and team production
relationships in the first place.
Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1757.
91. See DALLAS, supra note 17, at 255-56.
92. See Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at 261; Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and
the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA
L. REv. 105, 132 (2006). But see Duggin & Goldman, supra note 1, at 356 ("To the extent
the courts prove willing to enforce it, the Disney standard promises to promote general
trustworthiness instead of requiring actors to act, or refrain from acting, in specified
ways.").
93. See sources cited supra note 2.
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the same collective "group" as corporate management, they may be more
likely to trust management, even where management is being dishonest or
misleading. The same may be said of women who have relational
connections with corporate management. Similarly, male or female
directors or executives who view other individuals on the board or
management team, respectively, as members of their collective "group
94
may be more likely to trust and support the consensus of that group and
engage in "groupthink ''95 or other herding behaviors96 in their collective
decision making that may be detrimental to the corporation and its
shareholders. These observations are particularly relevant in light of theory
positing (and empirical evidence of) a positive relationship between board
tenure and in-group conceptualization.97  Similarly, female directors or
executives with personal relationships connecting them to other directors or
executives, respectively, may be more likely to trust and agree with those
others in their collective decision making, even when that trust proves
harmful to the corporation and its shareholders. Either basis for trusting
behavior, collective or relational, when unchecked by independent thought
and inquiry, may lead to suboptimal monitoring and management. Facts
and circumstances relating to each individual corporate director and
executive and each distinctive set of corporate directors and executives (as
well as, perhaps, other facts and circumstances, including the nature of the
action being taken) determine whether and, if so, which type of trust may
operate. These facts and circumstances necessarily will be fluid as board
and management team membership and individual director and executive
knowledge and experience change over time.
98
94. There is evidence that board tenure is positively related to group status among
board members. See Langevoort, supra note 90, at 811 ("[O]nce on the board, social ties
build so that, as Cox and Munsinger demonstrated in their study of board structural bias,
those members committed to the group gradually develop a sense of 'in-group' bias that
colors how they evaluate claims by others (such as derivative lawsuits brought by
shareholders) that threaten one or more group members.").
95. See Langevoort, supra note 90, at 810 ("That phrase, invented by Irving Janis,
refers to the tendency of cohesive groups implicitly (indeed, subconsciously) to censor
nonpreferred points of view and any information inconsistent with what is preferred."
(footnote omitted)). See also BRANSON, supra note 9, at 177-78; O'Connor, supra note 6, at
1238-39.
96. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why A Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1, 27-29 (2002); Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 28; Reza
Dibadj, Reconceiving the Firm, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1459, 1490-91 (2005); A. Mechele
Dickerson, A Behavioral Approach to Analyzing Corporate Failures, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 1, 28 (2003).
97. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 90, at 811; O'Connor, supra note 6, at 1303;
Nikos Vafeas, Length of Board Tenure and Outside Director Independence, 30 J. Bus. FIN.
& ACCOUNTING 1043 (2003).
98. It is important to note that these effects may be time-sensitive. Studies on
trusting and trustworthiness generally test trusting behavior toward and trustworthiness of
"strangers" - those previously unknown to the trustor on an individual basis. After a time,
directors and executives likely would become "known quantities" to each other, which may
The coexistence of both forms of trusting behavior - collective and
relational - on corporate boards of directors and management teams,
however, may create enough dissonance to provide the opportunity and
need for independent thought and inquiry. In a cooperative decision
making environment, where one board member is willing to trust an officer
of the corporation or a fellow board member and another is not, decision
making logically will require more reflection and deliberation than where
all agree to trust. This reflection and deliberation improves the decision
making process and is likely to generate a more well-considered decisional
output.99 Therefore, the very fact that board members and managers trust
differently may be beneficial to corporate decision making. This potential
benefit argues for diversification on the basis of gender at the highest levels
of the corporation as a means of diversifying trusting behaviors among
corporate decision makers.' 00
B. TRUSTWORTHINESS AND CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
1. Other-Regardedness
Existing research on sex and trust also indicates that corporate boards
and management may benefit from overall gender diversification because
of differences in or relating to the trustworthiness of men and women. For
have the tendency to increase collective or relational trust within or between the
corporation's board and its executives.
99. Cf KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 151-32 (propounding
and citing theorists in support of "[t]he notion that decisions produced by a finely wrought
process of dialogue and compromise are better than decisions made unilaterally by a
uniform group of individuals"); Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 44-46 (describing and
characterizing the benefits of disagreement among corporate directors); Langevoort, supra
note 90, at 810-11 ("The most productive boards are ones that have enough diversity to
encourage the sharing of information and active consideration of alternatives, but enough
collegiality to sustain mutual commitment and make consensus-reaching practicable within
the tight time frames in which boards must operate."); David O'Donnell & Philip O'Regan,
Exploring Critical Dialogue in the Boardroom: Getting Inside the Empirical Black Box of
Board Dynamics 5-7 (Mar. 2006), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=900967 (describing and illustrating the positive role of "critical dialogue"
in board decision making). This assumes that the directors can engage in cooperative
behavior that is conducive to informed decision making. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note
27, at 2 ("To increase board effectiveness it may not be enough to simply increase the
number of female directors on the board; diverse boards may require additional mechanisms
to ensure cooperation between directors."); Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 40-44
(describing and discussing certain aspects of board cohesion, composition, and trust); id. at
47-50 (suggesting the need for and means of achieving a "culture of dissent" - a respect
and acceptance for differences in group dynamics).
100. See infra note 117 regarding arguments for board diversity. It is important to
note that any considerations weighing in favor of gender diversification on the basis of trust-
related issues should be balanced against countervailing considerations, including any
related costs. See, e.g., Adams & Ferreira, supra note 27, at 19-20 (describing some of
these costs, based on their findings). Among other things, "[d]iverse boards may require
additional incentives to work cooperatively and may require additional time to digest
different viewpoints and resolve disagreements." Id. at 17.
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example, because women typically are more other-regarding than their
male counterparts, they may be less likely than men to take action for their
own personal benefit and more likely to take action (lawful or unlawful) for
the benefit of others, including the corporation and its shareholders.
Accordingly, the presence of women on a corporate board or in the
corporate executive suite may help avoid the replication of certain
perceived contributing causes of the fraud identified at Enron and other
corporations (including especially the acknowledged possibility that
corporate officers, many of whom also were directors, manipulated
corporate financial and other disclosures in order to enhance their own
equity-based compensation).10' Avoidance of these agency costs may help
enhance the overall trustworthiness of boards.'02
We also know, however, that other-regarding women may be white
collar criminals. Accordingly, trustworthiness borne of other-regardedness
alone may not protect the corporation from white collar cime.
Unfortunately, we do not know whether the white collar criminals in the
Collins study committed crimes involving corporate fraud like that
involved in the corporate fiascos uncovered in the early twenty-first
century. We cannot glean much from the Collins study, for example, about
either: (1) the nature of the positions the subject female offenders occupied
at the time their crimes were committed; or (2) the nature of the white
collar crimes that these women committed. These facts would be helpful in
assessing the applicability of the finding of the Collins study to gendered
trustworthiness in corporate decision making.
However, we do know from the Collins study that these other-
regarding women may take unlawful action to benefit someone outside the
corporation. In other words, a female director or executive may make
decisions on behalf of the corporation to benefit people or constituencies
other than the corporation and its shareholders. This behavior has the
potential of being as detrimental to the corporation and its shareholders as
the self-interested behavior associated with the Enron debacle and other
recent corporate scandals. Among other things, both behaviors may
constitute breaches of the state corporate law fiduciary duty of loyalty -
101. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Erica Beecher-Monas, Enron,
Epistemology, and Accountability: Regulating in a Global Economy, 37 IND. L. REV. 141,
156 (2003); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate
Finance, CEOs, and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 708, 736 (2005);
Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Many Strands: Executive Compensation: Enron Paid Huge
Bonuses in '01; Experts See a Motive for Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at Al.
102. However, the other-regarding and empathetic nature of women may not alone
be an accurate indicator that women are more trustworthy than men, as the Collins study
indicates. See generally Part I.B.3.
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or, worse yet, criminal activity. Accordingly, the other-regarding nature of
women may or may not be a positive gendered characteristic for a
corporate director or executive.
2. Risk Aversion
Further, female trustworthiness may be based on more than mere other-
regarding preferences. As the gendered trust literature indicates, female
trustworthiness also may be linked to risk aversion. 10 3 To the extent that
the trustworthiness of women is based on risk aversion, women may be
deemed less desirable as directors or executives. 1°4 Investors desire and
expect that corporate directors and managers will take some risks in their
decision making - conscious, well-considered risks for the benefit of the
corporation and its shareholders. 10 5 Further, managers may desire to take
risks for the benefit of the corporation and its shareholders that risk-averse
directors do not embrace. In short, female board members or executives
may be less able than male directors or executives to meet the risk
expectations of managers or investors.
However, even if female directors and executives are more risk averse
than male directors and executives, this different risk preference may add
valuable diversity to a corporate board or management team by changing
the presumptive risk profile of the board or management. As with diverse
trusting behaviors and differences in other-regardedness, diverse risk
preferences may enrich corporate decision making. The risk-takers and the
risk-averse will be required to discuss and deliberate to achieve consensus,
especially as to appropriate levels of corporate risk. 10 6 With different risk
preferences, a corporate board or management team should have the
capacity to engage in better quality decision making.
C. ANTI-FEMALE CEO BIAS AND CORPORATE DECISION MAKING
Yet, research tells us that directors and investors may have to overcome
latent biases against female corporate leaders to accomplish any desired
gender diversity in corporate management. °7 Under current corporate law,
securities regulation, and general practice, directors are identified and
nominated by a committee or the whole of the existing board of
103. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
104. Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("Shareholders
don't want (or shouldn't rationally want) directors to be risk averse.").
105. Id. See also Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1211
(2006).
106. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
107. This sex bias compounds a recognized general bias against diversity. See
Langevoort, supra note 90, at 811. However, the literature does not uniformly support a
bias against diversity. See Adams & Ferreira, supra note 27, at 3 (referencing the results of
various studies in this regard). See Bigelow & McLean Parks, supra note 73 (whose results
as to senior management teams, for example, may provide some evidence that women are
not subject to bias when part of a larger group).
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directors.10 8 The corporation's shareholders then have the right to vote on
nominees selected by the committee or the board, although the current
system of voting leaves almost no doubt that management's nominees will
be elected.'0 9  Similarly, corporate officers generally are elected or
appointed by the board of directors. l o Accordingly, any anti-female bias
that exists at the board or investor level - but especially, under current
rules, at the board level - may handicap efforts to accomplish gender
diversity on corporate boards and in corporate management teams,
regardless of the benefits that may be achieved by that gender diversity.'
108. BRANSON, supra note 7, at 179-80; Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note 68, at 599;
Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of "Corporate Democracy ": Shareholder Voice
and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 735, 744-45 (2003).
109. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520,
521 (1990) ("In theory, the shareholders of public companies elect directors, who watch
corporate officers, who manage/watch the company on the shareholders' behalf. But since
Berle and Means, we have understood that this theory is a fiction. The managers - the
current officers and directors - pick the directors, and the shareholders rubberstamp the
managers' choices.").
110. Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2005) ("[O]fficers are appointed and
can be removed only by, or under a grant of authority from, directors."); id. at 1607 ("[T]he
board of directors appoints and sets the compensation of senior officers, delegates
managerial responsibilities to those officers, and monitors and evaluates the managerial
performance of officers."); Joo, supra note 108, at 744-45 (noting, among other things, that
"director homogeneity contributes to executive homogeneity because directors control the
appointment of executive officers.").
111. Professor Doug Branson writes:
There may be differences between men and women, but by and large they
are small and overrated. In the workplace or on the job ladder, we must
strive to ignore those differences, except when they are absolutely
undeniable and inescapable. Then we embrace them. Only when such an
attitude is the most widely held one will corporate America remove many of
the obstacles that now forestall the advancement of women.
BRANSON, supra note 7, at 184-85. In fact, gender diversity on boards has been increasing,
and is predicted to continue to increase, at a slow rate. See id., at 87-108; Fairfax, Mixed
Data, supra note 68, at 581-89.
The number of women directors at Fortune 500 companies appears to have
increased by at least 1% over the last five years. If these patterns persist,
then within the next twenty years, virtually all Fortune 500 companies, and
perhaps even most all Fortune 1000 companies, may have at least one
woman on their boards.
Fairfax, Reflections, supra note 68, at 1109 (footnotes omitted). See also Robin Cohen &
Linda Komfeld, Women Leaders Boost Profit, BARRON'S, Sept. 4, 2006, at 37 (noting
evidence of the positive relationship between women corporate leaders and corporate
financial success, but cautioning that "the road toward gender parity in Corporate America
still is long."). Professor Branson questions whether women's current roles on corporate
boards constitute mere tokenism. BRANSON, supra note 7, at 109-110, 132-33, 152-53.
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IV. CONCLUSION: REFOCUSING ON BOARDS OF
DIRECTORS
Corporations generally are managed by or under the direction of their
boards of directors.' 12 As corporate decision makers, directors are critically
important to corporate governance. 13 If there is a locus of trust in the
corporation, it is the board. Directors are the macro-level corporate
managers, making organization-critical decisions and monitoring the
decision making of the corporations officers, the day-to-day managers of
firm operations. The board elects or appoints those corporate officers, and
the board (or a committee of its members) identifies and selects, with CEO
input and subject to shareholder approval, its own members." 4
Accordingly, if trust issues are to be addressed in corporate America, the
board should be the key focal point. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
recognizes the centrality of the board in corporate governance and its
effects on trust, but the Act and its regulatory progeny narrowly take aim at
the perceived crisis in corporate trust by using a restricted definition of
director independence as a cure-all. Based on existing research in the
social sciences, another possible and promising focus for enhancing trust in
the corporation is gender diversification of boards of directors.
This Article has a limited objective. It seeks not to add to or resolve
the different findings and musings of empiricists and theoreticians on trust,
sex, or board composition. Rather, this Article begins to tell a story about
the relationship among sex, trust, and corporate boards based on the
conceptual underpinnings of corporate governance and interpretations of
existing bodies of scholarly work on gendered trust and boards of directors.
The purpose of telling this fledgling tale is to further illuminate legal issues
surrounding board composition in the wake of our recent bout of corporate
fraud and the legislation and regulation that followed. This emerging "sex,
trust, and corporate boards story" is part of a larger body of research and
writing in process; sex is only one of many factors that have been, or
undoubtedly will be, identified as relevant to trust and the composition of
boards of directors.'
15
Regardless, recent scholarly work in psychology, sociology,
anthropology, economics, and other social science disciplines illuminating
sex-based differences in trusting behavior and trustworthiness may have
112. E.g., 8 DEL. C. § 141(a) (2006) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.").
113. See BRANSON, supra note 7, at 129 ("If corporate governance is a solar system,
the board of directors is the sun .... "). This does not mean that boards of directors can be
studied or otherwise considered in isolation in resolving corporate governance issues. See
Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1366-67.
114. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
115. Many recognize that there is a wide range of overall corporate governance
literature on board dynamics. See, e.g., O'Donnell & O'Regan, supra note 99, at 3-5.
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utility in helping to determine optimal corporate board composition. For
example, the studies profiled and described in this article indicate that men
and women trust and are trustworthy on different bases. Accordingly, the
inclusion of both females and males on boards of directors may positively
influence board process and deliberations by diversifying the bases for
trusting behaviors and trustworthiness in the boardroom. However, the
benefits of gender diversity on boards of directors may be difficult to
achieve based on underlying biases against women in corporate leadership
positions.
What will it take to confirm and flesh out the components of the basic
narrative suggested by the research presented and analyzed in this Article?
Among other things, more targeted empirical and theoretical work should
be done to directly test and explore the effects of sex-based trust issues in
the corporate decision making context to permit more refined conclusions
and solutions. Specifically, focusing on boards of directors, researchers
should theorize and test the trusting behaviors and trustworthiness of male
and female directors of varying tenures on various different kinds of
corporate boards.1 16 Moreover, female perpetrators of white collar crimes
should be studied on a more detailed basis. In each case, the knowledge
gained from these studies should enable directors and investors to better
screen possible board nominees for psychological and biographical traits
that best indicate trustworthiness and desired bases for trustworthiness.
Also, directors' and investors' bases and capacities for bias against female
directors should be more closely examined to ensure that optimal board
composition is achievable, even as these directors and investors gain
increased knowledge of the potential benefits of gender diversity on
corporate boards. In general, the results of these additional studies may
expose corroborating or new evidence that will enable a more direct and
nuanced assessment of the relationship among sex, trust, and corporate
boards.
In the interim, in the absence of this further targeted research, directors
and investors may want to consider the impact of existing broad-based
research on gender and trust in determining whom to nominate and elect to
corporate boards. In particular, it may be advisable to further encourage
gender diversity on corporate boards based on the apparent relationship
116. This type of study would form part of a growing body of work that attempts to
study board dynamics more directly. See, e.g., O'Donnell & O'Regan, supra note 99, at 16
(noting that "a number of researchers on corporate governance have embraced an alternative
research agenda that stresses the centrality of context and the necessity of gaining access to
the real world of board processes, dynamics and interactions."). The more specific the
study, the more valuable it may be, since trust is a complex, multidisciplinary concept. See
Dirks & Ferrin, supra note 19, at 451. Studying directors of varying tenure will be
important, since the typical trust game conducted in the cited studies measures trust among
relative strangers, not those with long-term, ongoing relationships. See Beecher-Monas,
supra note 4, at 40; supra note 98.
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between gender diversity and trust diversity. This suggestion emanates
from the existing research on sex and trust, but it is consistent with
proposals made by other scholars - in particular, corporate governance
scholars - on different grounds."17 Because of differences in their bases
for trusting behavior and trustworthiness, female directors may exhibit
trusting behaviors or trustworthiness in different circumstances or
environments than male directors exhibit trusting behaviors and
trustworthiness. As this article argues, the very existence of a difference in
trust on a corporate board may be beneficial. Among other things, varied
bases for trusting and trustworthiness among board members should
enhance thoroughness and caretaking in the boardroom, since not all
directors (at least initially) will trust or be trusted by the same people. This
thoroughness and caretaking ultimately should increase trust in and among
the various corporate constituencies.
818
117. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 7, at 176-79 (positing and assessing various
potential benefits to gender diversity on boards of directors); Adams & Ferreira, supra note
27, at 19-20 (noting that their "results suggest quite strongly that in boards with relatively
more women, more directors participate in decision-making, which may enhance their
effectiveness" and concluding that "increasing gender diversity may benefit firms in which
performance-related pay is less costly."); Beecher-Monas, supra note 4, at 4 (diverse boards
are more likely to achieve the kind of active, critical thinking that independence rules are
designed to achieve."); David Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and
Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33 (2003) (offering and analyzing data on the value of overall
board diversity); Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate
Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1383-87 (2002) (discussing gender diversity,
among other things, and its various impacts on corporate management); O'Connor, supra
note 6, at 1306-15 (regarding board diversity generally); Fairfax, Mixed Data, supra note
68, at 589-98 (summarizing and assessing arguments in this regard); Marleen O'Connor-
Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future Human
Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1258, 1349-51 (2004) (illuminating her
proposal that "[s]hareholder proposals to implement work-family policies should
recommend nominating more women, and particularly mothers, to corporate boards.");
Donald J. Polden, Forty Years After Title VII: Creating an Atmosphere Conducive to
Diversity in the Corporate Boardroom, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 67, 69 (2005) ("Improved
gender and racial diversity of corporate governing boards would enhance SOX's
fundamental policy of increased integrity in the management of large corporations through
greater independence and competence of their directors."); Janis Sarra, The Gender
Implications of Corporate Governance Change, I SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 493-94 (2002)
(setting forth certain benefits of diversity on corporate boards); Nina Smith et al., Do
Women in Top Management Affect Firm Performance? A Panel Study of 2500 Danish
Firms, http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=780910 (Aug. 2005), at 2-4
(summarizing arguments in support of gender diversity of corporate boards); Hayley
Buckridge, Note, Merging Without Purging: Incentivizing Boards of Directors to Promote
Diversity through M & A, 20 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 443, 496-99 (2006); see also
Fed'l Glass Ceiling Comm'n, A Solid Investment: Making Full Use Of The Nation's Human
Capital 5 (1995); Am. Mgmt. Ass'n, 1998 AMA Survey Senior Management Teams:
Profiles and Performance, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/senior.pdf, at 1
("Heterogeneity - a mixture of genders, ethnic backgrounds, and ages in senior
management teams - consistently correlates to superior corporate performance.").
118. Many have theorized about (and otherwise commented on) diversity's positive
effects on board dynamics. For example, in advocating for pluralism on corporate boards,
Professor Kent Greenfield suggests,
[Vol. 18:2
SEX, TRUST, AND CORPORATE BOARDS
Both the examination of existing broad-spectrum social science
research on sex and trust and the engagement of scholars in more
specialized research involving sex and trust in the context of board decision
making are important to ongoing debates in the area of corporate
governance. 119  In particular, as legal and other scholars continue to
theorize and test ways to increase trust in and among the constituencies
comprising the corporation and as scholars and rule makers consider
possible legal, regulatory, and other reforms targeted directly or indirectly
at the same, more detailed knowledge of the bases for trusting behavior and
trustworthiness in board decision making will be essential. 2 ° Only with
this further information will we best know how to effectively and
appropriately address important unresolved corporate governance questions
relating to both trust and gender diversity in corporate boards of directors.
corporate boards - now among the most homogeneous decision-making
groups in society - would stand to benefit from a greater openness and
diversity. Such openness would not only make for better decision making
but likelyfairer decision making as well.
GREENFIELD, supra note 99, at 152 (emphasis in original). Quite similarly, in the specific
context of gender diversity, Professor Doug Branson offers,
[di]versity will enhance small-group decisionmaking and diminish the
isolation of corporate boards. Many boards are men's clubs, in which the
members dress the same, have attended the same schools, and represent a
single social class. Directors and the boards on which they sit tend to be
isolated from what goes on in the society that surrounds them.
BRANSON, supra note 7, at 178-79.
119. Accord Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 1810 ("A solid understanding of the
social and economic circumstances that elicit trust behavior is accordingly vital to our
understanding of a wide range of social and legal institutions, including corporations and
corporate law.").
120. Cf Ashraf et al., supra note 14, at 6 ("If policy makers wish to raise the level of
trust, they need to know the determinants of trust. If trust is mainly a function of expected
trustworthiness, they should focus on the level of trustworthiness and on beliefs about that
level. In contrast, if trust is mainly motivated by warm-glow kindness, they should focus on
fostering of intrinsic rewards."); Hong & Bohnet, supra note 15, at 27 ("This paper suggests
that anyone wishing to increase people's willingness to trust may benefit from taking the
status differences in the relative importance of various motives into account and use the
corresponding institutional devices to address them.").
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